'FT ME begin by setting forth a position on the features of the "new inflation." First, the current widespread inflation across industrial coumitries is a "new" inflatiomi only in the sense tiat it is a phemiomimenon of the last ten years. The current inflation hmas not been largely determined by the. supply behavior of nonimidustrial countries. The basic cause of the current inflatiomi is the sanme as the cause of au previous inflations -too much money chasing too few goods.
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The most disturhlimmg aspect of the current imiflation is not timat timere imas been a moy-emeut from one rate of price imicrease te a mmew maintained hiigher level of price increase, bnt that there has beemi a periodic upward mnoveumem'mt in the rate t 1 f inflation. There is mio reasomm that timis process has to eoutmmmue. Policymnakers have time pouver to prevent a permammenty accelerating rate uf price immerease. It is true that more attention is being devoted to "how to hive with infiatiomi" rather thami "how to fight inflation," bmmt this is a very dammgerorms approaeim. A little inflation heads to a Note: The views expressed i'm this article are the respommsiImility of tIme autlmom' and do miot necessarily reflect the views or the Federal Reserve Systenm, little more immfiatiomm which leads toa little mnore imiflatiomi umitih irmflatiomi has heconie a mnajor disruptive fasce imi time eeomrmommmie as well as the social fabric of a country.
Arm exogemmorms decrease iii time srmpphy of omme good will te.nd to (1) raise time price of that good. (2.) raise the demrmmmmid for and prmee of substitrmte goods, ( 3) h.ower tIme de.nmmand for eomnphemnemmtary goods md. hemmee put dowmmward pressrmres om:m time prices of these goods) Time way a mmmarke.t eeommomny' adirmsts to a change in supply commditiomms is through eimammges in relative prices amid re-ahhocatiomm of resources frommm omme type of production to amiothier. Assumning rio Govermmnmemit controls mticom.m,.,m,.mmsts refer to two goeds as smmhstitrmtes if both goods have mmmamsv mmrcmpertie.s that satisfy time sarmme preferences of eonsummmers; for example, gas mmeat ammO electric heat, prmlmc trammsmmortatmon armd autommmohmlem, a vacation ins hmmrope and mm vacation i'm the Ummited States, Goods that a me tmsed trmgetlme are called complemmmemmtan' goods; for exammmpie. gmtsohimme ammd autonmobmies, tires amid am.itommmmohiles, Europeamm vacatiomms amid airline travel. on prices, resources will be bid away from those industries producing complementary goods and will mmmove immto indrmstries prodrmeimmg srmblstitute goods. 1mm-itiahly, tie average price level will rise, assuming prices of complementary goods are not immediately flexible downward, and nmmenmployment will temporarily rise since resources do not immediately move fully from producing eonmplementary goods to proclueing substitute goods.
For a decrease imi time supply of omme good to cause a pernmanemmt imicrease in immfiatiomi, Imolding growth of total expenditures eommst;tmmt, wouhh appear to require thmat the iteni was so vital to production thiat rmo substitute existed or eouid he developed In that case, reducing time supply of tmat good nmeans that the potential growth of real outpmit is reduced. Tins seems a itghly unlikely case, except in time short-run. Man seems capable of finding a substitute good for almost any item. However, even if this were the case, the immcrease in inflation is miot nltinmatehy drme to the reduetiomi imm supply, bunt results fronm tlme fact that growth of total expendittires is not reduced alomig with the reduced growth of real output. If the growth of total expendittmres is nmaintained, but time growth of real output is redtmced, themm prices will rise more rapidly. Time monetary autimorities cannot affect the suppiy situation, but tmey can follow policies that reduce the growtm of total expenditures.
Inflation began to develop in time United
States hong before any so-called supply-immduced effects developed. For example, over the 1963-69 period real output rose at an average annuah rate of 4.7 percent. comnpared to an average rate of about 3 percent over the previous ten years. However, from 1.963 to 1969 time rate of inflation increased to a 3 percent annual rate, about double the rate of the previous ten years. 2 We must hook somnewhere other timan at supply factors for the underlying cause of inflatiomm. Time basic underlying cause of time irmfhation cnrrentlv beimmg cxperiemmced in time United States is simply that time trend growth of mommey hmas lleen ;mceeherating over time last ten years, approaclmimmg a 7 percemmt rate on average rIver time ia5t three yemrrs. Thmis imas rc'sultecl imm a growths of chemmmammd for goods and services timat is mmmmmclm greater titan tIme lommg-termmm average growtim of real output.
hme curremmt immtent of mnonetary policy in time Ummited States is to reduce immfhatiomm ammcl avoid causing a substammtiah nmedirmmmm-ternm rise mm unemiiploymemmt. Imm fact this is time same "intent" timat hias characterized nione-2 Ummless mmtherwise mmoted, all growth mates arc commmtmutcd omm aim average-of-year basis. 'I'hmis brimmgs mis to the thirdh factomr. Time Federal Reserve Systemmm traditionally has been cormcenmed withm the stability of immterest rates ammd with time "vi.ahility" of fimmancial markets. Commseqnenmthv. time F'edernh Reserve hmas temmded to resist dhemammd-determimmedl movememmts in immterest rates and hmas ahway-s stood ready to offer substammtimml mudl to time financmah mmmarkets in times of shess. Thme suhmstmmmmtiah rise in Covermmnient fimmancing requirenments was humid to pumt upwardl pressures 0mm market immterest rates audi put stress 0mm fimmammcial markets. Essentially, the Cov-ermmnment xva.s attemptimmg to acquire more fo.nmds tlmamm before tlmroughm time credhit markets, audi, assummmiug rmo cimammge in time growthm of total credi.t, other demmmamm.diers of credht would have lmad to be ratiommed oust of time market.
Among thme (mthmer demanders of credit was the lionsbig industry-. As nmarket y-i.elds on Covernment deilt rose, fummds were drawn. out of savings amid hoan associatmons, the supply' of funds to finance lmousimmg fell, and mortgage interest rates rose. Questions arose about the solvency of the major fimmancers of mortgage credit. 'l'imese results. alommg myth pressures omi the fimmancimmg of state amid local gOvermmnmemmts, dleveloped quite early' imm time infiatiommary process, ammd in 1966 cuhnmimmated mm ivimat hmas commme td lie coiled "the credit crmmnchm (if 1966." The Federal Reserve came under commsiderabhe criticism for permmmittimmg time devehopmemmt of time "crummmcim" y~m;~yr. poi.icy
Infiatiomm affects current monetary policy because inflatiomm affects immterest rates and financial markets, Also, aeceherating inflation, whuen joimmed witim price confrohs, tends to raise qumestiomms about time predictive perfonnammee of ecouonmetric models that are used to forecast the response of the economy to policy actions. A further effect has heeim the suggestion by some observers that "real" instead of mmominal quantities should be used as indicators of time effects of policy actions.
Recentiy the Ummited States imas been experiencing levels of interest rates timat are "imighm" by historical standards. However, it would be imard to ascribe these Imigim interest rates to "tight" monetary policy. As shown imm Cimart III, over thme last three years thme immomoeta.ry base has gro\vn at a 7.7 perceomt rate, compared to about a 5 percefmt rate frommm 1962 through 1970 and hess than a 2 percent rate over time 1952-62 period. Bammk credit immms growmm at about mm 13 percemmt rate since 1970, conmpared to a 7.6 percent rate over time previoums five years, amid about a 6 percemmt rate frommm 1955-65. Thmese growth rates immdicate that Federal Reserve actiomms have resulted mm a large enougim growth of time mommetmmry hiase to sumpport a substantially more rapid expammsion of haimk credit thmami imm previous periods. An immcreased rate of growtim of time mmmoney stock appears to have two effects 0mm expectatiomms of fimmammcial mimarket participammts. First, timey have hearmmed by cxperiemmce over the last 8-10 years timat a mnaintained faster growtim of mmmo6mey mimeans a imigimer rate of inflation, and timat meamms hmigbmer immterest rates. Also, financial mmmrket observers hay-c some idea mmhout thme Federal Reserve's desired growth path for time niomsey stock, \Vhmemm they observe time money stock growing faster thmami whmat time>' thiiruk is time Eederai Reserve's iimtemmt. tbmemm time>' expect tlmmtt time Federmmi Reserve wiH imave to tighmtemm policy', asic 1 lmemmce expect imigimer interest rates, at lemmst in time nmmmedmate ftmture.
To restrict time growtlm of tIme mmmoney stock in periods of risimmg demands for credit, time J'ederal Reser\e must rmmise its target range for time Fcderah funds rate ahead of time immarket deternmmed hevel. If ilmcreases ism time target range for time Federal fummds rmmte lag time niai'ket-determmmimmed rate, then the !mmollev stock wiil accelerate, eveom timoumgim time Federah fnmmds rate moves upward quite rapidly.
Central hankers nmust he extremmiely' wary of statements that, imecause immterest rates are high, nmommey is tight or monetmmry policy actmomms more restrictive. Such statememmts exbmibit a fummmdasmmesmtm.mi eommfusion betweemm money amid credit timmmt cmmim be fmmtal for attempts to slow inflation. Interest rates are time price of credit, not the price of money. TIme reasomm tIme price of credit is imighm is not because mmiommey is tight, hmmt because it has heemm too easy. Time pre\'ioums rapid growthm of money bias generated aim expected rise imm demammd mmmmd rising prices ammd, imence, gs-owismg demmiands for credit. Commmparimmg Cimart \1 asmd Chmart II, it can be seen that, enmpirieahiy. it is time case timat iomv imiterest rates, not hugh interest rates, fohlow mm period of tiglmt nmoney.
On. O.mimery' Am!
An immmportant pmu-t of time flmmmmimeimmi sector of time limited Stmmtes is eonmposed of flmmammcial intenmmedimmries whmmeim horrow shmort-temnm and lend long-ternm. Thmese institumtsonsar e priniarihy engaged in fimmasmeimmg mmmortgage credit denmaimcis, mmmmd consist of hmstitumtiomms suds mts savimmgs mod loan mtssociatiomms, immmmtmmmmi sa\'ismgs banks, life insumrmmnce companies. mnmd remmi estmmte investmmmemmt trusts. For these fiomanciai immtermmmediaries it is mmot time level of time termn sirumeture of ismterest rates timmmt is of prnmmmmr immmportance, humt vmmriabomms imm time ievei.
Jim mmmi muccelerating inflation, mmmrket ismterest rates 0mm assets eoimmpetitive untim sam-iligs dcpmmsits are rising, and savings immstitutioims immust raise time interest rates time>' pay to horromv short-term or fact' an outflow of (heposits. Under sucim cireuimmstmmuees. the savings mstitutions come uimder commsiderahie pressure. Time cost of imorrowimug slmort-termmm rises rapidiy, immmt time bmmik of thmeir portfolio of assets is locked ioto nommhqmiid loimg-ternm nmosrtgages thmat imave mm fixed interest rmmte.
Time smmmoothm operation (If finasmcimmh mimarkets is also adversely affected in otimer ways by' inflation. For A potemmtiahly serious situmatiosm c-aim develop if a few large financial immstitutiomms misread time future path of interest rates. Suppose a lender expects that interest rates mviii fmdh in time mmext six nmonths. 1mm late 1973 and early 1974 several respected financial advisory services were forecasting failing ismterest rates. Time hender will timemm try to borrow slmort-term 1mm order to exteimd his long-ternm assets. For example, a hank would try to immcrease its borrowimmgs in time Federal funds mmmarket and sell short-term large certificates of deposit, while extemmding longer-term business loans-amid purclmasimmg longer-tenmm Covernment securities. If, however, simortterm rates rise very rapidly, instead of failing as predicted, tlmen om-hypothetical bank will incur losses.
Fronm early Decemmmber 1973 tlmrougim late February 1974 short-term ismterest rates iim the United States fell whmihe longer-term interest rates continued to rise. From late Novenmber to hate February, large commercial banks increased their term business loans by about $1.3 bilhiomm amid timeir holdings of Covermmment securities withm over 5 yemmrs to nmaturity imy almout $600 million. Over the same period, time volunme of large certiflcates of deposit oumtstammdnmg immcremmsed by ahiout $2 billion and time average mmet purchmase of Federal funds rose by $2.6 billion. In early March, shos't-ternm immterest rates began to increase ammd over time fohiowimig nuonths rose yes-mt shmarphy'. Time mmmmmiket rate oim 90 (Ia>' certificates of cieposit rose over 300 basis poirmts from late February to mid-May, and time rate 0mm Federal funds rose over 250 basis poismts. Therefore, time cost to an individual imank of ohmtaimmmsmg short-term fummcis to flnasmce ternm balms made during late 1973 mmd earl>' 1974 mmmmd to carry' securities purcimased cbmmriug tlmat time rose sumbstammtialhy imm time foilowismg three moumthms, Thus discumssion is not amm mottemmmpt tim picture time flnmmncimmh systenu mms "ismherenthy unstahmhe." It is immtemmcbed to simow thmat attemmmpts liv time mmmommetarv aumthorities to resist denmammd-determusied opwmurd pressures on ismterest rmttes, except in ti a' very shmort ruin, do soot result in easing flmmammciah market pressures As time nmormetary' authmormties expammd time mnosmetarv lmase, mnommey' expands amid ultinmateiy thmere'are gremmter uspward pressures omm interest rates as time denmanch for credit immcreases. Ultimately, such a policy results in greater, not hess, strain imm time flmmammciah smmarkets, ammd makes time problems encountered by time central bank wimen it attesmmpts to slow imuflatiomm that nmuchm greater. 'l'hmis is econonuy has been subject to various types of price controls. Timese cosmtrohs prohahmiy distorted time behmavior of pmices rehative to wimat time>' would imave been without controls. Under timese conditions, econometric nuodels are only a guide to the upward pressines that are building on prices.
For exanmple, the St. Louis model overestimated the reported rise in prices during the period of price controls, Imut since the lifting of most price controls, it has underestimated the increases in prices. On balance, thue mnodeh has fairly accurately projected the hong-run Imehavior of prices. As shown in Tahhe I, fitring the nuodel thurormgim time secoimd quarter of 1971, time last fnil quarter before price controls, and projectimmg thmronghm 1973 simows thmat time smmochei estimmmateci about mm 5 pereesmt growtim of time price deflator frommm 11/71 t]mroughm IV/73. Actual reported prices rose at a muuucim shower rmmte durimmg time price coimtrol period. thmemm acceles'mmted mms price cosmtrohs were hifteci. There are five periods from 1955 to 1973 when time ratio of money to commnodity prices declined for two (Jimarters or nmore: 1955 -57, 1959 -60, 1966 , 1969 , and 1973 . Prior to 1973 , eacim period in which "real hmalances" dechined for two quarters or more was foliomved imy a sigmmiflcaomt shomvclown imm economic activity, ramugimug from the 1966-67 mimmi-recessiosu to full-scale recessions in time othuer periods.
In 1955-57, 1959-60, 1966 , and 1969 a large portion of the decline in real balances reflected a sharp drop in the rate of growthm of time money stock below its tremud. Time deceicration in mnommey growtbm imm 1973 was smot as mmhrupt. Immsteach, time indicmoted dechime imm "remmi hmmhammces in 1973 reflected, imm large pmurt, time reported micceieratiomm of inflmotiomm.
Since time adjustment of prices to a change in the trend rate of money growth is estimated to take fronu foumr to six y'ears to complete, it is probahhe that tIme economy is still adjusting to the acceherated rate of money growtlm over the last three and one-half years. Supporting evidence for timis contention can be found in time nuovement emf interest rates in 1973.
The inflation of last year, instead of threatening to restrict aggregate demand by eroding real money balances below desired hevchs, reflects instead the efforts of time public to dispose of excess money hmdammces. On time basis of past experience, if time momuey stock coimtinned to grow at aim average rate of close to 6.5 percent, such as since early 1970, this mmdjustment would continue at least thiouglm 1974.
The arguments wimieh contend timat monetary policy is restrictive, on flue basis of the recent decline in "real mommey balances," imply to some aimahysts a recomnmenclation to pohcyinakers to increase time rate of money growtim above time rate of inflation in order to restore time growth of real balances. Both theoreticah analysis and time experience of otiuer couimtries imidicate that there are few mmmore dangerotms courses of actiosm timat any monetary authority could ummehertake.
A further increase in time rate of money growth, above its current trend rate of about 6.5 percent would only generate pressure for furtimer inflation. It is not possible to avoid the adjustment of real money balances to the level desired by thue public by increasing the rate of money growth.
Oime extrenme example of the futihty of a policy of trying to make money grow fast enough to prevent desired real bahances from fahhing is given by the German experience in the early 1 9 20s. By hate 1923 tax receipts of time German government were covering hess than one percent of its expenditures. To finance its expenditures, time government borrowed from the Reiehsba.mmk, which simnply tunmed on the printing presses. The majonty of trained economists in Germany refused to believe in a chain of causation running from the growth of the money stock to the growth of prices. Rudolf Havenstein, President of the Reichshank, tended to believe that the rise in prices created a need for money on the part of businessmen and the government which was the Reiehsbank's duty to meet, and which would have almost no harmful effects on the econonmy. \Vimemm coimupiaimmts of "shortages" of muommey arose, despite time issue of demmonmimmations as large as 100 billion marks, Havenstein seriously expressed hope that new high-speed currency printing presses soon to be installed would overcome the shortage. Recently, proposals for tying future payments in contracts to some price index (so-called indexing) and explicit payment of interest on demand deposits have been suggested as ways of removing some of the losses associated with unexpected future price movements.
in.aexnr.g
The use of indexing has increased in the U.S. econonmy as inflation has accelerated. Recently, the U.S.
Congress decided to tie social security payments to the consumer price irmdex, amid nmore wage contracts are being written with cost of living escalator clauses, not only for wages, but also for pensions. 5 However, these actions represent only partial indexing. At present, it does not appear that the U.S. is likely to adopt a full economy-wide pattern of indexing. Especially difficult problems would arise when indexing such items as interest rates. For example, attempts to develop variable interest rate mortgages have met with less than enthusiastic support.
Partial indexing probably creates more problems than it solves. Groups wlmose flow of payments are linked to sonue price index will lie far less willing to support efforts to halt inflation. This is especially true because policies taken to slow inflation also involve some simort-run rise in unemploynment. It is one thing to explain the reason for tighter fiscal and monetar>' policy to aim individuah by pointing out that increased Government spending financed by money creation results in a fahi imm his reai inconme; it is nmticim more diffictmit, however, to convmmmce him of time merits of tigimter fiscal and monetary policy wimen his inconme is tied to a price index. However, as a practical mmmatter. a widespread movenmeimt in support of paymemut of immterest on dienuand deposits does imot appear hikeiy in time near future. Cimammges in legislation would be required to permit comnuercial haimks to mmmake explicit interest paymuemuts 0mm demmmmmimd deposits, mmmmd timere (hoes imot appear to be wide emuougim support for timese chmmmmmges fronm any wehi-orgammized political group.
co.Nc~LusIoNs
The way to reduce ismflationary pressures imm time United Stmttes econommmy is to slow time growth of time muoimey stock. On an mmverage-of-year to mmvermtge-ofyear basis, time money stock grew at about a 7 percent rate fronm 1970 to 1973. It seenms to be a gemmerahly accepted propositiomu imm ecommoimmics timmmt time growtlm of prices' adijusts to time growtlm of mommey over aim cxteimded penod of timmme. Therefore, if time 7 percermt rmmte of mnoney growtiu expenemmced over time last three r'ears imm the U.mmited Stmmtes is mauntmuned, timis inuphes our econonmy-~viii adjust toward! a ioimg-ruim 6-7 percemmt rate (if inflation. Time recemmt surge imm prices reflects partly mum adijustmmment to tIme renmoval of price coimtrols, and partly time commtimmuec! upward! mmdjustnmemmt to time mmverage growtim of time mmmoney stock.
Time ommi>' way to halt the upivard movenment of immterest rates is to slow mommey growth. If our econonmy is hemnmg forced to adijust to a 6-7 percemmt annual rate (if immflatiomu, timeim mmommmimmmml interest rates omm long-term hommds will imot remmmmmin at aronmud S pereemmt hint prohaimie will rise to 9-10 perceimt. Whetlmer or not timis "imutemmt" is remmhized will crucially depemmd upomu (1) time Gos'enummment's wihitmgmuess to exercise restraint in its spemmding. and (2) a wi!lingmmess on time pmtrt of time Federal Reserm-e to allow market interest rates to rise teimmporanly to luigim levels.
In time United
As disctm,ssed earlier, muonmumal immterest rates thmat seem extremely higim by historical stmnmdards' are mmot hmighm wimeim time curremmt rate of imufiatiomu is takemm into account.
It is useful to refer agaimm to time Germamm experience
of 1920-23 to see how excessive govermmnmemmt spendnmg amid central hiammk ereatiomm of mmmommey becomne hoummd togetimer, and imow difficult it is for mmmmy cemmtrmml hank to ptirsue a mommetary policy timat runs cotmmmter to the govermmnueimts fiscal policy.
This fmumdmummemmtmml cause, insnfmmr as it (hoes mmot rest 0mm tIme hialammee of~iaynmeimts, is ---time hommmmdless gm-owtl I of the flomitimmg debt mm mmd its trmmmusf ormum mm tion iimto time lneamms of paymmment -. . tlmrouglm time discountimug of time Reiclm Treasury-bills amid time Reichmshammk.
Here too the Reiehsbank is alleged to be guilty, beemmuse it has not opposed time Reiclm govermmmnemmt and fiscal adnministration by refusing to continue time c!iscoummtimug of Treasury hills. Tlmis reproach is also ummjustified mimic 1 completely' nmisjudges the actual situ- 
Author's Note
Somehow time ptmhlie must he commvinced thmat once immflation imas gaimmec! a flnmm footimohd there is no paimmless way to Imalt it. Also. tlme public must realize timat goods provided hiy time governmmmemut are mmot free goods.
If thme governmermt sector mmhsorhs amid rec!istrihutes a
harger segnmemmt of real output, thmemm time private sector rmmtmst he satisfied witim a smnmmhler simare. Ummiess timese fummdamnemmta! facts are ummderstood, timen time good "immtent" of policy will probably mmot be realized. 
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